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Case No. 18306 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action involves a boundary dispute between adjoining 
property owners. Plaintiffs seek to quiet title to the dis-
puted portion of land, and claim the establishment of a boundary 
by acquiescence. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\IBR COURT 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, defendants 
moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted the 
motion and summarily dismissed plaintiffs' action, holding 
that the legal doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is not 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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applicable where the true boundary is capable of being ascer-
tained. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment of the trial 
court and reinstatement of their action. Inasmuch as re-
spondents have not yet presented their evidence, a new trial 
will be required. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 10, 1951, L. H. Stratford and Ella Stratford, 
his wife, purchased approximately five (5) acres of land 
at 4800 South and approximately 10th East Streets in Salt 
Lake County (R-111; Exhibit 28). The property was bounded 
on the north by Big Cottonwood Creek (although the actual 
boundary is the subject of this litigation). Earl C. 
Morgan (the father of the defendants) owned property 
north of Cottonwood Creek, and at the time of the purchase 
by Stratfords operated a dairy farm on his property (R-150, 
151, 153). 
The following drawing (although not to scale) is 
illustrative of the layout of the parties' properties. The 
area marked in yellow is the parcel in dispute: 
- 2 -
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The Stratfords purchased their property for the purpose 
of operating a hobby farm, where Mr. Stratford could raise 
horses, cows, sheep, other livestock, ducks and birds (R-111, 
142, 145). 
At the time of the purchase of the Stratford property 
in the spring of 1951, there was a partial fence in existence 
along the south bank of Cottonwood Creek. L. H. Stratford, 
that same spring, reconstructed the fence using the part 
that was already in existence, and adding new fence materials 
to the areas where the fence was not in existence (R-116, 131, 
133, 147). The completed fence was made partly of cedar posts 
and partly of steel posts; was spanned by chain link wire; 
and was from five to seven feet in height (R-115). The fence 
constructed by Mr. Stratford has remained in place and un-
changed since 1951, a period of more than thirty (30) years 
(R-115, 139). 
The Stratfords have exclusively occupied the property 
to the fence line since they purchased the property (R-118). 
L. H. Stratford constructed and developed a fish pond, part 
of which was on the disputed property (R-117). The fishpond 
itself was surrounded by a seven to eight foot chain link 
fence with barbed wire at the top (R-117). It was used to 
stock fish and for private fishing (R-117). In addition, 
Mr. Stratford constructed a racetrack type training track to 
train horses. The training track was of wood and pipe 
- 4 -
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construction and was located partially on the disputed property 
(R-117). The property was also used for grazing (R-118) and 
for the raising of alfalfa and other grains (R-118). 
Since the purchase of the property by the Stratfords, the 
Morgans have never used property beyond the fence for any pur-
pose (R-119, 147, 158). In earlier years, there were a couple 
occasions when the Morgan horses got under the fence and into 
the Stratford property. The Stratfords were upset and told 
the Morgans they didn't want Morgans' horses on the Stratford 
property. Mr. Morgan said that he would see that the problem 
was taken care of, which he did (R-146). 
In addition to the above, no member of the Morgan family 
ever made any claim to the property in dispute until shortly 
prior to the collllilencement of this suit (R-119, 145, 163). 
In July of 1972, L. H. Stratford died (R-111). The property 
was later conveyed by Mrs. Stratford to the plaintiffs, Charles 
H. Stratford and Robert L. Harris, who hold the title in trust 
for the Stratford grandchildren (R-142). In 1979, Charles H. 
Stratford had the property surveyed (R-133). The survey dis-
closed that the metes and bounds description of the Stratford 
property does not go to the creek, and that part of the dis-
puted parcel is within the Morgan deed description (Exhibit 27). 
Charles H. Stratford did not agree that the survey accurately 
shows the location of the boundary line (R-134). 
- 5 -
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Earl C. Morgan died in March of 1980 (R-152). The defen-
dants in this action are children of Earl C. Morgan and acquired 
the property from their father prior to the time of his death 
(R-152). 
After plaintiffs rested their case, defendants made a 
motion to dismiss. The court expressed its belief that inas-
much as the Stratford survey showed no conflict in the surveyed 
b9undary between the prop·erties that there could be no dispute 
or uncertainty as to the boundary. In ruling from the bench, 
the court made the following conmlent (R-174): 
"I know from my discussion with the Justices at the 
Supreme Court (in a case where Judge Conder parti-
cipated) that if the description can be ascertained 
that there is no description which is in dispute". 
The court then ruled in effect that a boundary by acquiescence 
can never apply unless it is shown that the actual boundary 
cannot be establised (R-174). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE PRIMA FACIE ESTABLISHED A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
AND THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
A. In A Boundary By Acquiescence Case It Is Not Plaintiff's 
Burden To Show That The True Boundary Is Unknown, Uncertain Or 
In Dispute. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has long been part 
of the common law of the State of Utah. The doctrine is based 
- 6 -
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upon sound public policy with a view of preventing strife and 
litigation, and in establishing stability in boundaries. Holmes 
v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 809 (1906). It is said that peace 
and good order of society is best served by leaving at rest 
possible disputes over long established boundaries. Thus, where 
there has been any type of recognizable physical boundary, which 
has been accepted as such for a long period of time, it should 
be presumed that any dispute or disagreement over the boundary 
has been reconciled in some manner. Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725 
(Utah 1974). 
In implementing the above purposes the Utah Courts have 
consistently and repeatedly held that there are four necessary 
elements that must be shown in order to establish a boundary 
by acquiescence. The elements are: 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by 
monuments, fences or buildings. 
2. Acquiescence in the line as a boundary (meaning mutual 
recognition). 
3. For a long period of time (generally considered to be 
twenty (20) years). 
4. By adjoining land owners. 
Fucco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156; 389 P.2d 1943 (1964); King v. 
Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 (1963); Hale v. Frakes, 
600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979); Monroe v. Harper, 619 P.2d 323 (Utah 
1980). 
- 7 -
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If all of the above elements are met, then the burden 
shifts, and it becomes the responsibility of the party deny-
ing the boundary by acquiescence to show by competent evidence 
that a boundary is not established. Fucco v. Williams, supra; 
King v. Fronk, supra. Specifically, the cases hold that a 
plaintiff is not required to produce evidence showing that there 
is a dispute or uncertainty as to the true boundary. The 
existence of a dispute or uncertainty is a fact that is pre-
sumed from the passage of time. King v. Fronk, supra; Brown v. 
Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (19Sl);Motzkus v. Carroll, 
7 Utah 2d 237, 322 P.2d 391 (1958). In Brown, for example, the 
court states: 
"But the Tripp case does not require a party relying 
upon a boundary which has been acquiesced in for a 
long period of time to produce evidence that the 
location of the true boundary was ever unknown, un-
certain or in dispute. That the true boundary was 
uncertain or in dispute and that the parties agreed 
upon the recognized boundary as the dividing line 
will be implied from the parties' long acquiescence". 
And in Motzkus v. Carroll, supra, the court held as follows: 
"From the foregoing, it is clear that where a party 
by evidence establishes a long period of acquies-
cence in a fence as marking the boundary line between 
two tracts, he is not required to also produce evi-
dence that the location of the true boundary line 
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. The 
establishment of a long period of acquiescence in a 
fence as marking the boundary line between the two 
tracts by the respective owners gives rise to a pre-
sumption that the true boundary line was in dispute 
or uncertain, which places, at least, the burden of 
producing evidence that there was no dispute or un-
certainty but that the true boundary line was known 
to the respective owners on the party claiming that 
such was the fact. Where, as here, there is no 
- 8 -
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I 
evidence on that question other than the proof 
of acquiescence in the fence as marking the boundary 
line for the required long period of time, the trial 
court must find that the boundary line by acquies-
cence has been established". 
And in King v. Fronk, supra, the court states that the absence 
of dispute or uncertainty in fixing a boundary is an element 
"which, it is said, might be eliminated as a factor by an im-
plied agreement based on passage of time". 1 
B. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden To Show An 
Absence of Dispute Or Uncertainty As To The Boundary Line. 
If the above authorities acc~rately represent the law in 
the State of Utah the question is thus posed: Does the fact, 
in and of itself, that the true boundary line is capable of 
being ascertained overcome the presumption of a dispute or un-
certainty in the boundary line? If so, the trial court properly 
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. But if not, the trial court 
has committed reversable error. It is plaintiffs' position 
of course, that it does not. 
Counsel has been unable to find any reported cases hold-
ing that a boundary by acquiescence is precluded if the true 
boundary is capable of being ascertained. Indeed it is suggested 
1 At footnote 5 in King v. Fronk, supra, the court goes even 
further and states that a boundary by acquiescence can be based 
upon mistake. And in Baum v. Defa, supra, the court upheld a 
boundary by acquiescence even though the alleged boundary fence 
was constructed at a time when both tracts were in common 
ownership. 
- 9 -
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that in virtually every boundary by acquiescence case it is 
possible to find the true boundary. There are numerous cases 
in the Utah Reports where boundaries by acquiescence have 
been established. See e.g. King v. Fronk, supra; Motzkus v. 
Carroll, supra; Brown v. Peterson Development Company, 622 
P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980). The cases usually recite the location 
of the true boundary as an admitted or proven fact. The 
ability to locate the true boundary through deed descriptions, 
so far as counsel is aware, hasn't even been argued as being 
inconsistent with a boundary by acquiescence. 
In the instant case, there are many possible circumstances 
that could have caused an uncertainty about the boundary line. 
For example, the plat at the back of plaintiffs' abstract of 
title (Exhibit 28) shows Big Cottonwood Creek as the boundary 
of the property. Obviously, if the 1979 survey admitted into 
evidence is correct there must have been a movement of the creek 
at some point in time. There is no evidence to show how or 
when the creek moved. There is, however, a body of law to 
the effect that boundaries follow stream beds in the event 
of accretion or erosion, but do not follow stream beds in the 
event of avulsion or sudden change.2 78 Am Jur 2d, Waters §411. 
The very existence of this body of law could easily have created 
2 It is also presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary 
that the change was made through erosion and not avulsion. 
78 Am Jur 2d, Waters §427. 
- 10 -
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an uncertainty or dispute between the adjoining land owners 
as to the location of their boundary. 
There are also possibilities that errors were made in 
earlier surveys (Mr. Charles H. Stratford testified that he 
did not agree with the survey made in 1979). It is even 
possible that the parties executed documents changing the 
boundaries and that the documents are lost or unrecorded. 
The boundary could even have been established upon an earlier 
claim of adverse possession. All of these things may be 
speculative; however, it must be remembered that defendants, 
not plaintiffs, have the burden to establish the absence of 
an uncertainty in the boundary line. After 30 years of 
acquiescence it simply isn't reasonable to believe there was 
no uncertainty, and certainly there was no evidence before 
the court to overcome the presumption. It is unfortunate that 
the parties who really knew about the boundary dispute are now 
deceased. This, however, is but another reason why a boundary 
of long standing should not be disturbed. If the parties know-
ledgable about the circumstances never complained about the 
boundary, it would seem that the court should not permit heirs, 
having no knowledge to complain. 
It should also be pointed out that in the instant case, 
the Stratfords not only reconstructed the boundary fence, but 
also constructed improvements upon the disputed portion of 
the property, that is a fishpond and a training track. It is 
- 11 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
said that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence rests 
partly upon the principle of estoppel, and that a landowner 
who knows the true line and silently permits an adjoining 
owner to make improvements is estopped to claim the true 
boundary. 12 Am Jur 2d, Boundaries §89. At best this 
principle should be an absolute bar to defendants' claims; 
at worst, it is persuasive evidence of the uncertainty of the 
boundary and the belief by Earl C. Morgan that the Stratfords 
were on their own land. 
In summary, it is clear that there was insufficient evi-
dence from which the defendants could rebut the presumption of 
a dispute or uncertainty in the boundary. The only evidence 
at all on this issue was the deed descriptions and the 1979 
survey, and the ability of the trial court to ascertain the 
true boundaries therefrom. It is illogical that this evidence 
alone could overcome the presumption, particularly inasmuch as 
disputes and boundary uncertainties can easily arise from cir-
cumstances other than deed descriptions. There is no case 
authority to support the position of the trial court. The 
position is not consistent with the policy of the law to give 
stability to boundaries of long standing. 
C. The Case of Madsen v. Clegg Was Not Intended To Over-
rule Established Utah Case Law. 
In granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss in this case, 
the trial court indicated that it was relying upon the recent 
- 12 -
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case of Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981). Unfortunately, 
Madsen discusses the law of boundary by acquiescence but does 
not touch upon the matter of presumptions. A casual reading of 
the case would seem to imply that a party claiming a boundary 
by acquiescence must prove the existence of a dispute or uncer-
tainty. However, a careful reading of the case shows that the 
party denying the acquiesced boundary overwhelmingly proved 
either a lack of dispute or a lack of acquiescense. The facts 
in Madsen showed as follows: 
1. A fence existed on the true boundary line at the time 
of the construction of the second fence relied upon as the 
acquiesced boundary. 
2. There was affirmative testimony that the new fence had 
never been agreed upon as a boundary. 
3. The plaintiffs paid taxes every year for the purpose 
of preserving his claim to the entire property. 
4. Plaintiffs had made application for a well, support-
ing his testimony that he regarded the disputed property as his 
own. 
5. Plaintiffs actually drilled a well to "prove up" his 
water rights. 
6. Plaintiffs used the property from time to time to 
trap muskrats. 
It is little wonder in Madsen that the court found that the 
evidence utterly failed to establish that a boundary had been 
- 13 -
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established by mutual acquiescence. None of the above facts, 
nor anything similar thereto, appear in the instant case. 
There is nothing in Madsen to imply that the court intended 
to overrule case law of long standing. The court even affirma-
tively stated "that in the absence of an express agreement as 
to the location of the boundary between adjoining landowners, 
the lawwill imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, 
if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing (emphasis 
added)". Some of the very cases relied upon by plaintiffs 
are cited with approval in Madsen. If the court intended to 
overrule these cases, it would have said so. It would seem 
that the common law of the state should not be overruled by im-
plication. 
There is further no language at all in Madsen to the effect 
that a boundary by acquiescence cannot exist if the true boundary 
can be ascertained (the standard applied by the trial court in 
the instant case). 
Madsen should be construed by the court only in light of 
its own facts. If, however, the court truly intended to make 
a drastic departure from the prior law, then Madsen should be 
reconsidered in light of the strong policy of the law to stabilize 
boundaries. 
- 14 -
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' 
PROFFERED EVIDENCE 
During the course of the trial, the court sustained objections 
to plaintiffs' proffer of an attorney's title opinion given to 
L. H. Stratford at the time the Stratfords purchased the property 
in 1951 (proffered Exhibit 29; R-120, 165); to correspondence 
between L. H. Stratford and the Salt Lake County Commission relating 
to the washing conditions on Big Cottonwood Creek (proferred 
Exhibit 30; R-121, 166); and to the proffered testimony from 
Mrs. Ella Stratford as to her understanding that the north 
boundary of the Stratford property was the center of Big Cotton-
wood Creek (R-143). Plaintiffs submit that all of these rulings 
were erroneous. 
The Title Opinion. The title opinion was a communication 
between Mr. Stratford and his attorney wherein referencewasmade 
to the movement of the creek bed. The opinion also makes reference 
to Mr. Stratford's belief that the Stratford property went beyond 
the creek. It also advises Mr. Stratford as to the law of 
accretion and avulsion. This evidence was excluded on the ground 
of hearsay. 
Hearsay is generally defined as any out of court statement 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. 3 The hearsay 
3 Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
- 15 -
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rule does not operate to render inadmissible every statement 
or writing made by an out of court declarant. It does not ex-
clude evidence offered to prove the fact that a cormnunication 
was made, rather than the truth of the cormnunication. Where the 
very fact of the communication becomes independently relevant, 
regardless of its truth or falsity, the evidence is not hearsay. 
Durfey v. Board of Education of Wayne County, 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1979); Webb v. Webb, 123 Utah 16; 253 P.2d 372 (1949); 29 Am Jur 
2d,Evidence §497. Where the state of mind of a person is a 
relevant fact, declarations showing the state of raind are admissible 
as primary evidence, notwithstanding that the declarant is un-
available as a witness. 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §650. 
The outcome of this litigation turns solely upon the question 
of whether there was an uncertainty in the boundary line. It 
would seem that the state of mind of the landowner is highly 
probative of the existence or nonexistence of an uncertainty. The 
title opinion was not offered to prove the truth of anything stated 
therein. It was offered to show Mr. Stratford's state of mind 
and that he believed his boundary extended beyond the creek. 
The mere fact that Mr. Stratford asked his attorney and received 
advice about a questionable boundary, lends high credibility to 
the existence of a reasonable uncertainty in the boundary line. 
This evidence was not hearsay and should have been received by 
the trial court. 
Correspondence With Salt Lake County. The correspondence 
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between L. H. Stratford and the Salt Lake County Commission like-
wise was offered to show Mr. Stratford's state of mind. It was 
not offered to prove the truth of anything in the letters, but 
only to show that Mr. Stratford treated the property to the creek 
as his own. The same authorities that apply to the title opinion 
would also compel a determination that this evidence is not hear-
say. 
Testimony From Mrs. Stratford. Mrs. Ella Stratford, the 
widow of L. H. Stratford, proffered testimony that she understood 
their boundary line to extend to the center of Big Cottonwood 
Creek. This evidence was objected to and excluded without any 
grounds being stated for the objection. The issue before the 
court was whether or not an uncertainty or dispute existed as 
to the boundary line. Mrs. Stratford was the only original party 
that was still alive. Her understanding, even though subjective, 
would be relevant as to whether a dispute or uncertainty existed. 
It could, of course, be argued that her testimony is self serving, 
but this would go to the weight and not the admissibility of the 
evidence. 
Under the theory upon which the judge disposed of the case, 
the evidence exclusions may not have made a material difference. 
On retrial, however, this evidence ~ay become very important to 
plaintiff's case and the Supreme Court should rule on these issues 
so that the errors will not be perpetuated. 
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POINT III 
THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WAS IMPROPER 
The judgment of the court (R-90) decrees that plaintiffs 
have no fee simple interest in certain property described 
by metes and bounds in the judgment. The legal descriptions 
are taken from Exhibit 27 and include areas in which the 
Morgans have no record title. The Morgan property is not 
contiguous with Stratfords entire north boundary, but only 
part of it (see illustration at page 3). Thus, the lan-
guage of the decree clouds a portion of property possessed 
by plaintiffs in which the defendants have no interest. 
The posture of this case on appeal is the granting 
of a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evi-
dence. The judgment of dismissal should be modified to 
merely decree that plaintiffs' action against defendants 
based upon boundary by acquiescence is dismissed. 
This issue is, of course, moot if the appellants prevail 
under Point I of this brief. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND 
THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE EVIDENCE 
Plaintiffs approached the trial of this case with a strong 
belief that they could easily prove all of the elements neces-
sary to establish a boundary by acquiescence. For this reason, 
they did not see any need to rely upon adverse possession. How-
ever, plaintiffs were caught by complete surprise when Judge 
Conder explained his interpretation of Madsen v. Clegg, supra, 
as being a radical departure from prior case law. Plaintiffs 
therefore moved to amend the complaint to conform with the evi-
dence and add an additional cause of action based upon adverse 
possession (R-166). This motion was denied by the trial court 
because 1) plaintiffs had earlier indicated to the court that 
they did not intend to rely upon adverse possession and 2) be-
cause the trial court did not believe the evidence showed that 
the Stratfords had paid taxes on the disputed parcel (R-174). 
As to 1), in hindsight it may not have been the smartest 
thing to be so over-confident and to rely upon what counsel 
considered to be plaintiffs' strongest theory. However, the 
adverse possession evidence was before the court and not really 
in dispute. Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent, they shall be treated in all re-
spects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. The court 
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has recently interpreted this rule to mean that judgments 
should be granted in accordance with the law and the evidence 
as the ends of justice require; and that this is true whether 
the pleadings are actually amended or not; and in pursuing this 
objective the proper application of the rules is that amendments 
are to be allowed if necessary where a case has been tried on 
a different issue or a different theory than has been pleaded. 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859 
(Utah 1979). The ends of justice would require that the court 
consider adverse possession. 
As to 2), the tax notice in evidence (Exhibit 31) was 
representative of all tax notices received from 1951 through 
1981 and it was stipulated that the Stratfords paid the taxes 
on this description during that period (R-122, 123). Although 
the tax description is the same as the deed description, the 
tax notice shows the Stratfords property to contain 5.07 acres. 
The survey of the Stratford deed description shows 4.77 acres 
(Exhibit 27). The difference of .30 acres is very close to 
the amount of acreage in the disputed parcel, and the disputed 
parcel is, of course, the only other property possessed by 
the Stratfords. Thus, the Stratfords have in fact been paying 
taxes on the entire parcel that they possess. Under these 
circumstances, it is urged that a prima facie showing has 
been made that would satisfy the tax payment requirement of 
§78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as cited 
herein, it is respectfully urged that the judgment of dismissal 
of the trial court be reversed and that the matter be remanded 
for a new trial. Appellants also urge the court to make 
rulings on the evidence issues in order to avoid further 
error upon the retrial. 
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